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The	Shutdown	Problem:	How	Does	a	Blockchain	System	End?		Mark	Stuart	Day	MIT	/	Jefelex	Systems	LLC	mday@alum.mit.edu			
Abstract			We	define	and	examine	the	shutdown	problem	for	blockchain	systems:	how	to	gracefully	end	the	system’s	operation	at	the	end	of	its	useful	life.	A	particular	focus	is	those	blockchain	systems	that	hold	archival	data	of	long-lived	interest.	We	outline	what	it	means	to	achieve	a	successful	shutdown,	and	compare	those	criteria	to	likely	end-of-life	conditions	in	a	generic	blockchain	system.	We	conclude	that	the	decentralized	nature	of	blockchain	systems	makes	shutdown	difficult,	particularly	if	the	system	uses	an	unstable	consensus	like	the	Nakamoto	consensus	of	Bitcoin.	Accordingly,	we	recommend	against	using	blockchain	with	unstable	consensus	for	any	data	whose	value	is	likely	to	persist	beyond	the	life	of	the	blockchain	system.	For	any	such	systems	that	are	already	in	operation,	we	recommend	considering	a	hard	fork	to	implement	stable	consensus.	Such	consideration	needs	to	happen	well	in	advance	of	the	system’s	end	of	life.			
Introduction		Descriptions	of	blockchain	systems	often	assume	a	roughly	steady	state	in	which	there	is	an	adequate	supply	of	honest	nodes.	However,	wise	system	design	recognizes	that	at	some	point	in	the	future	the	system	will	become	obsolete	and	must	be	replaced	or	shut	down.	When	we	consider	the	overall	system	life	cycle,	there	are	intervals	at	the	start	of	system	operation	and	at	the	end	of	system	operation	when	the	steady-state	conditions	clearly	do	not	apply.			These	transitions	are	of	no	great	importance	for	toy	blockchain	systems,	or	those	dealing	with	highly	transient	data.	However,	a	number	of	proposed	and	operational	blockchain	systems	involve	data	that	is	likely	to	be	of	some	importance	over	a	long	period	of	time.	For	example,	MIT	offers	digital	diplomas	[DT17,	M17].	One	claimed	advantage	is	that	the	credential	will	still	be	valid	even	if	MIT	itself	no	longer	exists	as	an	institution.	Likewise,	there	are	local	governments	using	blockchain	for	public	records	such	as	birth	and	marriage	certificates	[AP19].			It	is	easy	to	assume	that	these	kinds	of	records	(birth	certificates,	marriage	certificates,	diplomas)	are	stable	and	reliable	even	when	their	storage	system	is	reaching	the	end	of	its	life.	Correspondingly,	it	is	a	source	of	concern	if	we	learn	that	such	records	may	be	subject	to	loss,	corruption,	or	forgery.		
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Even	if	a	particular	data	record	itself	is	not	of	obvious	long-term	value,	it	may	be	important	to	preserve	as	part	of	an	aggregate.	For	example,	a	small	financial	transaction	two	years	ago	may	still	be	important	for	auditing	or	investigation.			For	all	of	these	blockchain	systems	with	long-term	data,	we	consider	what	it	means	for	the	blockchain	system	to	end.	In	particular,	we	look	at	how	we	can	distinguish	between	desirable	and	undesirable	endings,	and	what	options	are	available	to	mitigate	the	problems	identified.			We	first	describe	an	informal	notion	of	a	good	ending	for	a	general	information	system	(ignoring	blockchain	issues).	Then	we	describe	an	informal	model	of	a	generic	blockchain	system.	Even	this	generic	blockchain	system	has	aspects	that	make	it	hard	or	impossible	to	achieve	a	good	ending.	We	consider	some	possible	ways	to	adjust	the	generic	blockchain	system	to	support	good	endings.	Finally,	we	discuss	the	implications	of	this	analysis.		
What	is	a	good	ending?		Consider	some	generic	system	(not	necessarily	a	blockchain)	storing	long-term	data.	If	such	a	system	is	to	be	replaced	or	decommissioned,	we	can	identify	some	features	that	we	expect	to	be	true	at	the	end	of	its	life:		 1. The	stored	information	should	be	in	a	stable	form.	Since	the	system	is	not	continuing	to	operate,	there	should	not	be	additional	changes	to	that	information.	2. There	should	not	be	an	ongoing	commitment	to	operating	or	supporting	the	old	system.	However	it	is	accomplished,	there	should	be	a	sharp	reduction	in	the	cost	of	maintaining	the	stored	information.		We	can	summarize	these	points	by	saying	that	a	good	ending	for	the	system	renders	the	stored	information	into	a	form	that	is	stable	and	cheap.	If	the	information	is	unstable,	and/or	if	there	is	a	substantial	ongoing	expense,	we	would	not	consider	that	to	be	a	good	ending.			(We	note	that	this	may	be	only	a	partial	description	of	the	requirements	for	a	good	ending:	there	may	well	be	additional	requirements	that	sensible	people	would	demand.	However,	it	seems	clear	that	any	ending	that	does	not	meet	these	requirements	is	not	a	good	ending.)			For	any	information	system,	finding	a	good	ending	is	the	shutdown	problem.	Equivalently,	we	can	say	that	solving	the	shutdown	problem	requires	finding	a	good	ending.			This	description	of	the	shutdown	problem	is	applicable	to	any	information	system,	and	has	no	necessary	relationship	to	blockchains.	In	the	next	section	we	describe	
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blockchains,	and	in	the	following	section	we	consider	the	shutdown	problem	for	blockchains.		
System	model		We	describe	a	generic	blockchain	system	as	follows:		 1. A	community	of	nodes	jointly	constructs	a	shared	sequence.		2. The	elements	of	the	sequence	are	data	blocks	that	are	chained	together	via	digital	signatures.		3. Each	node	maintains	its	own	local	version	of	the	sequence.		4. The	local	versions	at	two	different	nodes	may	be	different.		5. The	correct	state	of	the	sequence	–	and	in	particular,	the	content	of	a	new	block	at	the	end	–	is	determined	via	some	form	of	consensus	executed	among	the	nodes.		6. Some	nodes	are	honest,	while	others	are	dishonest.	(Sometimes	for	simplicity	we	will	assume	that	honest	nodes	are	always	honest;	but	in	general,	our	model	allows	each	node	to	choose	dishonest	behavior	when	it	is	advantageous.)	7. Correct	operation	of	the	system	depends	on	having	“enough”	honest	nodes,	as	determined	by	the	specific	consensus	mechanism.	8. At	least	some	of	the	information	stored	in	blocks	may	be	of	interest	to	nodes	other	than	the	one	that	added	the	block,	at	a	point	in	time	later	than	the	block’s	addition.		For	the	concerns	we	examine	here,	the	specifics	of	signing	don’t	matter.	Likewise,	more	elaborate	topologies	than	a	single	chain	(side	chains,	branching)	don’t	matter	as	long	as	there	is	some	part	of	the	system’s	operation	that	acts	as	a	literal	blockchain:	that	is,	a	chain	of	blocks.			This	generic	system	model	is	broad	enough	to	include	both	open	and	permissioned	blockchains.	In	an	open	blockchain,	any	node	at	all	can	participate;	in	a	permissioned	blockchain	there	is	some	kind	of	gatekeeper	determining	which	nodes	can	participate.			(A	gatekeeper	may	make	it	harder	for	dishonest	nodes	to	participate,	but	it	is	unlikely	that	any	real	gatekeeper	can	guarantee	that	only	honest	nodes	participate.	As	we	will	see,	part	of	the	problem	of	ending	a	blockchain	is	that	it	may	take	only	a	single	dishonest	node	to	cause	problems.)		The	system	model	is	broad	enough	to	include	a	variety	of	different	consensus	mechanisms.	In	particular,	we	consider	both	stable	and	unstable	consensus	mechanisms.			With	a	stable	consensus	mechanism,	the	addition	of	a	block	is	never	subsequently	revised;	the	chain	may	be	extended	but	the	existing	chain	is	never	revised	at	any	
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node.	With	an	unstable	consensus	mechanism,	any	block	is	subject	to	revision;	the	last	block	is	relatively	easy	to	revise,	the	previous	block	is	much	harder	to	revise,	and	so	on	with	increasing	difficulty	to	the	beginning	of	the	chain.	The	so-called	Nakamoto	consensus	implemented	in	Bitcoin	[N08]	is	an	important	example	of	an	unstable	consensus	mechanism.		When	the	system	includes	a	sufficient	fraction	of	honest	nodes,	the	overall	system	works	correctly	and	we	may	refer	to	it	as	being	in	its	“honest	mode.”	When	the	system	does	not	include	a	sufficient	fraction	of	honest	nodes,	the	overall	system	is	open	to	corruption	and	failures,	and	we	may	refer	to	it	as	being	in	its	“dishonest	mode.”	For	simplicity,	we	assume	that	there	is	only	one	correct/honest	mode	of	operating	and	one	incorrect/dishonest	mode.			(For	our	purposes,	it’s	sufficient	to	establish	a	single	simple	example	of	the	shutdown	problem.	Although	there	might	be	some	interesting	aspects	in	scenarios	with	competing	dishonest	nodes,	none	of	those	scenarios	will	serve	to	negate	the	problems	we	identify.)		Given	this	system	model,	there	are	two	key	issues:			 1. The		“old”	part	of	the	ledger	is	not	easily	modified,	while	the	“young”	tail	of	the	ledger	is	(relatively)	easily	modified.		2. Honest	operation	depends	on	having	an	adequate	supply	of	honest	nodes.			We	next	define	some	terminology	to	help	describe	whether	there	is	an	adequate	supply	of	honest	nodes.		
Smooth	vs.	lumpy;	thick	vs.	thin	
	We	consider	a	universe	of	potential	nodes	for	a	blockchain	system,	and	a	community	of	those	nodes	that	actually	comprise	the	blockchain	system	at	any	point	in	time.	Every	node	we	consider	is	always	part	of	the	universe,	but	may	or	may	not	be	part	of	the	community.		We	can	characterize	the	system’s	operation	as	smooth	or	lumpy.	When	the	system	is	
smooth,	it	does	not	matter	if	we	randomly	add	a	new	node	to	the	community	or	remove	an	existing	node	from	the	community.	Despite	the	change,	the	system	continues	to	operate	in	its	same	mode	(honest	or	dishonest).	In	contrast,	when	the	system	is	lumpy	there	is	at	least	one	node	in	the	universe	whose	addition	or	removal	changes	the	mode	of	the	system	from	honest	to	dishonest	(or	vice-versa).		Sometimes	a	lumpy	system	is	caused	by	a	node	that	has	an	unusual	weight	(by	whatever	measure	is	used	in	the	consensus	scheme).	However,	systems	necessarily	become	lumpier	as	the	size	of	community	shrinks,	even	if	the	weight	is	divided	evenly	among	all	nodes.	Accordingly,	we	can	characterize	a	community	of	nodes	in	a	
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blockchain	system	as	thin	(lumpy,	or	at	risk	of	lumpiness)	or	thick	(smooth	and	with	no	near-term	risk	of	lumpiness).			We	note	that	this	thick/thin	analysis	becomes	more	complex	if	nodes	are	allowed	to	become	dishonest.	In	particular,	when	there	are	relatively	few	nodes,	an	honest	node	may	have	a	larger	incentive	to	behave	dishonestly.		
Thick	and	thin	shutdowns		It	is	plausible	to	have	a	shutdown	problem	with	either	a	thick	or	thin	community.	A	thick	shutdown	means	that	the	system	is	moving	to	an	ending	even	though	there	are	still	plenty	of	active	nodes.	This	kind	of	shutdown	can	occur	when	there	is	a	deadline	imposed	by	some	outside	entity,	perhaps	due	to	regulatory	changes.	As	we	will	see,	a	thick	shutdown	is	easier.		A	thin	shutdown	means	that	the	system	is	moving	to	an	ending	partly	or	entirely	because	of	the	dearth	of	honest	nodes.	In	those	circumstances,	we	have	to	consider	that	the	system	may	switch	to	dishonest	operation	at	any	moment,	or	indeed	may	have	already	entered	that	mode.	A	thin	shutdown	is	harder,	but	is	also	probably	the	more	likely	situation.			
How	does	a	blockchain	system	end?		Let’s	consider	a	simple	example	of	a	good	ending	and	see	where	it	can	go	wrong.	We	make	the	following	assumptions:		
• consensus	is	stable	
• the	system	is	operating	honestly	
• the	community	is	thick	
• there	is	a	“final	block”	that	is	readily	understood	as	signifying	the	end	of	the	chain.			As	long	as	the	system	continues	honest	operation	long	enough	to	add	the	final	block	at	the	end	of	the	chain,	the	system	reaches	a	good	ending.	(To	recap	those	criteria:	the	information	stored	is	stable,	there	is	no	need	for	ongoing	engagement,	and	there	is	no	difficulty	with	establishing	authenticity	of	the	information).		Now	let	us	take	up	each	of	the	assumptions	in	turn,	and	note	the	associated	problems	if	the	given	assumption	does	not	hold.		
Unstable	consensus:	The	shutdown	problem	is	notably	harder	with	a	consensus	mechanism	that	is	unstable,	so	that	an	apparent	decision	may	be	later	reversed.	One	important	example	of	an	unstable	consensus	mechanism	is	the	Nakamoto	consensus	underpinning	Bitcoin.	In	a	blockchain	system	using	Nakamoto	consensus	(or	something	similar)	the	status	of	the	last	block	in	the	chain	is	in	some	sense	contingent.	There	is	no	explicit	declaration	that	the	last	block	is	valid,	although	there	
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can	be	an	explicit	declaration	that	some	particular	block	is	invalid.	Instead,	there	is	a	kind	of	superposition	of	states:	the	last	block	of	the	chain	might	be	the	one	we	know	about;	or	it	might	be	some	other	one	we	don’t	yet	know	about,	or	perhaps	one	that	we	know	about	but	have	chosen	to	disregard	in	favor	of	the	one	we	are	treating	as	the	last	block.			This	slightly	weird	fuzziness	of	the	last	block	actually	extends	all	the	way	to	the	first	block,	albeit	with	lower	likelihoods	as	we	move	earlier	in	the	chain.	The	degree	of	fuzziness	depends	on	details	of	the	consensus	mechanism.	Because	the	“truth”	of	the	blockchain	is	determined	by	the	community	of	nodes,	it	is	possible	for	changes	in	that	community	to	produce	changes	in	the	chain.			If	an	honest	community	reaches	some	kind	of	final	statement	in	a	blockchain	with	stable	consensus,	they	can	collectively	leave	the	blockchain	alone.	They	don’t	care	if	dishonest	players	append	garbage	after	the	final	block.	But	if	the	consensus	is	unstable,	they	can	never	rely	on	that	blockchain	as	an	archive	unless	they	remain	engaged	in	it,	and	engaged	in	a	way	that	outweighs	any	potentially	competing	dishonest	nodes.			It	is	safe	for	honest	nodes	to	abandon	a	blockchain	that	contains	no	information	of	any	continuing	interest.	However,	if	that	blockchain	contains	any	information	that	might	need	to	be	preserved,	it	can	never	be	abandoned	by	the	honest	nodes.	Leaving	the	blockchain	alone	allows	it	to	be	rewritten	by	dishonest	nodes.		We	consider	possible	mitigations	of	these	problems	in	a	later	section.			
Dishonest	operation:	If	the	system	is	already	operating	dishonestly,	or	if	the	system	starts	to	operate	dishonestly	before	a	final	block	is	stable	on	the	chain,	then	the	final	block	may	not	be	written	or	the	chain	may	be	otherwise	corrupted.			
Thin	community:	Even	if	the	system	is	operating	honestly,	a	single	failure	by	an	honest	node	may	be	enough	to	tip	it	into	dishonest	operation.	Likewise,	a	single	new	dishonest	node	may	be	enough	to	change	the	system.	Notice	that	in	some	cases	an	honest	node	may	choose	to	become	a	dishonest	node.	As	we’ve	already	noted,	we	expect	that	the	behavior	of	the	system	will	be	lumpier	when	there	are	fewer	nodes	–	independent	of	the	consensus	mechanism.		Although	the	usual	concern	with	dishonest	nodes	focuses	on	weight	within	the	consensus	mechanism,	it’s	worth	noting	that	dishonest	nodes	could	also	flip	the	system	into	dishonest	operation	by	subverting	communications.	With	a	thin	community	and	multiple	dishonest	nodes,	it’s	possible	that	an	unsuspecting	honest	node	is	communicating	entirely	with	dishonest	nodes	that	could	suppress	or	forge	messages.		
No	final	block:	A	typical	blockchain	system	lacks	any	mechanism	to	add	a	“final	block.”	Indeed,	it	is	not	clear	that	such	a	mechanism	is	a	good	idea	other	than	when	
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one	is	trying	to	solve	a	shutdown	problem.	It	would	seem	to	be	a	risk	for	possible	mischief.			
Mitigation	strategies		In	this	section,	we	consider	possible	approaches	to	mitigate	the	problems	identified	in	the	previous	section.		
Mitigating	unstable	consensus:	In	a	system	using	unstable	consensus,	the	clearest	solution	would	be	to	somehow	substitute	stable	consensus.	Unfortunately,	such	a	replacement	is	difficult.	First	is	the	general	problem	of	any	hard	fork:	changing	the	system	in	an	incompatible	way	necessarily	means	splitting	the	existing	community,	and	only	those	nodes	agreeing	to	the	new	consensus	would	be	part	of	the	new	system.	Second	is	the	specific	concern	that	the	adoption	of	stable	consensus	would	necessarily	be	determined	by	the	existing	unstable	consensus.	Particularly	with	a	thin	community,	it	might	well	be	hard	or	impossible	to	get	the	desired	result.		It	may	be	hard	to	avoid	a	situation	in	which	a	new	node,	playing	by	the	original	rules,	finds	the	“old”	system.	If	we	were	concerned	with	continuing	operation,	we	would	also	be	concerned	with	the	possibility	that	our	hard-fork	change	was	adopted	by	only	a	minority	of	the	nodes.	But	here	our	specific	goal	(to	shut	down	the	system)	is	actually	advantageous:	it	may	be	completely	reasonable	to	have	a	split	in	the	community	between	a	stable,	finished,	archived	system	and	the	unstable,	unfinished,	and	untrustworthy	“live”	system.			Now	let’s	consider	what	is	possible	if	for	some	reason	we	can’t	bring	in	stable	consensus,	and	are	stuck	with	an	unstable	consensus.	Is	there	an	alternative	to	permanent	engagement	with	the	system?	There	could	be	some	lower-commitment	way	in	which	the	blockchain	is	preserved	–	one	that	uses	physical	irreversibility,	for	example.	We	could	envision	an	honest	community	that	combines	blockchain	with	archival	technologies,	so	that	some	part	of	the	blockchain	could	never	be	rewritten.	The	challenge	is	to	decide	when	something	is	“solid	enough”	to	become	irreversible.	Although	there	may	be	a	workable	solution,	our	informal	exploration	of	this	topic	suggests	that	any	fixed	threshold	could	be	exploited	by	dishonest	players	to	invoke	the	permanent	archiving	incorrectly	(and	in	an	unfixable	way).	At	a	minimum,	we	complicate	analysis	of	the	system’s	current	state	and	overall	correctness:	we	introduce	the	possibility	of	a	chain	that	somehow	cannot	be	replaced,	even	though	it	is	not	part	of	the	longest	chain.	
	
Mitigating	thin	community:	The	lumpiness	caused	by	too	few	nodes	may	be	avoidable	at	the	start	of	the	system	by	pursuing	strategies	to	rapidly	increase	the	number	of	nodes	–	for	example,	“air	drop”	approaches	that	effectively	give	away	tokens	or	otherwise	provide	incentives	for	joining.			If	we	think	of	a	plot	of	“number	of	nodes	over	time”	for	the	entire	life	of	the	system,	we	know	there	is	some	initial	ramp	from	zero	and	a	final	ramp	to	zero.	We	know	
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how	to	steepen	the	slope	of	the	initial	ramp	so	as	to	move	rapidly	into	smooth	operation.			Unfortunately,	we	don’t	know	how	to	steepen	the	slope	of	the	final	ramp.	And	although	we	can	discuss	the	abstract	concept	of	smooth	vs.	lumpy	behavior,	nodes	in	an	actual	community	do	not	have	any	accurate	and	timely	way	to	judge	their	blockchain’s	situation.		It	doesn’t	seem	that	it	makes	any	difference	whether	the	nodes	are	balanced	and	weighed	by	effort	or	by	stake	–	there	is	still	a	problem	that	as	the	number	of	nodes	shrinks	and	the	community	becomes	thinner,	the	system	is	vulnerable	to	dishonest	behavior	that	does	not	occur	when	the	community	is	thick.					(We	could	think	of	this	by	analogy	with	classical	vs.	quantum	behaviors,	and	observe	that	classical	behaviors	depend	on	having	enough	atoms	or	particles	so	that	statistical	issues	dominate.	When	the	number	of	atoms	or	particles	is	small,	then	the	statistics	don’t	dominate	and	instead	random	individual	choices	or	events	matter,	and	weird	quantum	behaviors	are	observable.)			This	appears	to	be	a	general	observation	about	blockchain	systems.	It’s	well-known	that	there	must	be	a	prevalence	of	honest	nodes	for	the	system	to	work	(honestly).	But	it	seems	less	well-known	that	there	must	be	a	certain	quantity	of	nodes	(stakes,	work)	to	avoid	situations	in	which	a	single	random	node’s	behavior	potentially	tips	the	overall	balance.				
Mitigating	final	block:	In	a	system	without	any	clear	marker	for	ending	a	chain,	we	could	introduce	such	a	marker	as	a	hard	fork.	The	discussion	of	difficulties	resembles	the	one	we	presented	above	for	mitigating	unstable	consensus.			
Archiving	the	blockchain?		Part	of	blockchain’s	promise	is	to	be	a	collective	ledger.	Unfortunately,	when	we	consider	archiving	the	ledger	the	situation	becomes	rather	dubious.	There	is	no	straightforward	way	for	today’s	blockchains	to	become	low-overhead	but	stable	archives.			First,	we	observe	that	conventional	solutions	based	on	a	single	archive	are	likely	to	be	unattractive	for	information	that	is	being	stored	on	a	blockchain.	After	all,	if	the	designer	of	the	system	were	willing	to	entrust	the	information	to	a	single	party,	they	could	have	built	the	information	store	in	a	much	more	straightforward	fashion	–	no	blockchain	at	all,	just	some	kind	of	a	database	mediated	by	the	trusted	single	party.			For	some	particular	situation	it	may	be	acceptable	to	solve	the	shutdown	problem	in	such	a	not-very-blockchain-like	way;	but	in	general,	an	archiving	solution	cannot	depend	on	private	copies	or	central	authority.	So	we	expect	that	part	of	ending	a	
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blockchain	would	include	designating	multiple	archivists.	Presumably	this	designation	would	itself	be	a	record	on	the	blockchain.			What	does	such	an	archivist	do?	One	possibility	is	to	simply	snapshot	the	state	of	the	blockchain,	take	a	hash	of	the	snapshot,	and	publish	the	snapshot’s	hash	to	the	New	York	Times	[H19].	As	with	any	blockchain	system,	there	would	be	some	doubt	about	the	validity	of	the	last	few	blocks,	but	the	bulk	of	the	archive	would	be	preserved.	Between	the	internal	consistency	mechanisms	of	the	blockchain	and	the	published	snapshot,	we	would	be	confident	that	the	data	had	not	been	corrupted.		However,	even	if	one	is	using	one	of	these	designated	archives,	there	are	natural	concerns	about	provenance	(how	do	we	know	that	the	data	is	connected	to	what	was	originally	on	the	blockchain?)	and	authenticity	(how	do	we	know	that	the	data	is	unaltered	from	what	was	originally	on	the	blockchain?).	If	we	genuinely	don’t	trust	any	of	the	archivists	to	get	it	right,	we	potentially	need	to	compare	multiple	copies	of	the	archived	data;	however,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	those	copies	will	be	resolvable	to	a	single	version.	We	can	check	that	the	data	within	a	single	archive	is	consistent	–	we	can	reject	it	if	it	doesn’t	meet	the	correctness	requirements	of	the	particular	blockchain.	But	we	can’t	otherwise	distinguish	between	two	offered	versions	of	a	particular	blockchain.		A	live	blockchain	has	some	handy	properties	that	are	no	longer	available	when	we	are	looking	at	recorded	versions	of	a	blockchain.		There	is	an	additional	problem	of	redirecting	from	the	live	chain	to	the	archive	chain(s).	It’s	not	clear	how	you	can	do	that	reliably,	given	the	other	problems	that	these	systems	have.		Fortunately,	we	know	that	it	is	expensive	to	forge	a	blockchain,	and	the	cost	increases	for	older	blocks.	In	many	–	perhaps	most	–	cases,	we	do	not	need	to	be	concerned	about	an	attacker	constructing	an	entirely	forged	chain.	However,	any	such	reassurance	depends	heavily	on	the	value	of	the	stored	data,	and	the	consequent	potential	reward	from	changing	it.	There	are	sometimes	surprising	results	from	carefully	examining	the	economic	incentives	for	attacks	[A19].					
Analysis	and	discussion	
	
No	exit?		In	most	cases,	for	most	blockchain	systems,	the	shutdown	problem	is	hard	or	impossible.	There	is	no	straightforward	way	to	declare	that	a	history	is	finished	and	archived.	If	you	do	not	care	enough	about	the	integrity	of	the	data	to	keep	working	at	it	(and	potentially	recruiting	others	to	assist	you)	then	your	history	will	potentially	be	corrupted	or	vanish.	Blockchain	thus	seems	perversely	unsuitable	for	some	of	the	applications	for	which	it	has	been	proposed.	In	any	situation	where	one	is	keeping	shared	and	publicly-visible	records	that	need	to	be	accurate	and	stable	for	long	periods	of	time,	a	blockchain	is	a	poor	choice.		
	Public	version	1.1	2/19/19	2:44	PM	 	 10	
	
Bankruptcy	principles		It	is	tempting	to	consider	a	poorly-functioning	blockchain	system	near	the	end	of	its	useful	life	as	comparable	to	an	insolvent	person	or	organization.	We	might	wish	to	find	some	counterpart	to	bankruptcy	that	can	be	invoked	by	honest	players,	in	much	the	same	way	that	a	debtor	can	resort	to	bankruptcy	or	a	creditor	can	force	a	debtor	into	bankruptcy.	However	the	change	is	caused,	bankruptcy	represents	a	new	operating	regime	in	which	rules	are	radically	changed	and	an	outside	authority	is	supervising	some	kind	of	reorganization.	Instead	of	being	concerned	with	repayment	of	debts	and	preservation	of	capital,	the	focus	of	a	hypothetical	“blockchain	bankruptcy”	would	be	the	accurate	preservation	of	archival	information	despite	the	faltering	nature	of	the	associated	blockchain.			However,	with	a	blockchain	system	there	is	typically	no	technical	or	legal	framework	to	do	such	a	bankruptcy	or	reorganization.	The	decentralized	nature	of	the	system	makes	it	impossible	to	impose	supervision.	The	problems	identified	in	previous	sections	make	it	hard	for	any	“final”	or	“reorganized”	version	of	the	blockchain	to	take	the	place	of	the	failing	live	system.		Even	if	we	had	such	a	framework	in	place,	it	still	seems	technically	challenging	to	ensure	that	good-faith	queries	about	a	failed	blockchain	are	successfully	redirected	to	the	archive.	The	nature	of	a	blockchain	system	suggests	that	dishonest	nodes	could	successfully	spoof	or	hijack	such	queries.	Given	that	such	dishonest	players	are	already	showing	they	are	not	inclined	to	behave	correctly,	additional	legal	framework	is	unlikely	to	improve	the	situation.	Instead,	we	may	need	to	think	in	terms	of	purely	technical	means	to	ensure	the	integrity	of	a	blockchain	that	is	no	longer	active.			
Related	Work		Potential	node	misbehavior	is	a	fundamental	consideration	in	essentially	all	blockchain	systems.	However,	such	concerns	typically	focus	on	preventing	attacks	during	ordinary	system	operation.	There	is	considerably	less	attention	paid	to	issues	of	thin	communities	and	even	less	attention	to	the	question	of	winding	down	a	system.		However,	some	authors	[CKW+16,	TE18,	A19]	have	noted	unexpected	effects	or	incentives	for	nodes	in	a	likely	future	configuration	of	Bitcoin.	When	block	“mining”	rewards	are	no	longer	dominant,	nodes	will	earn	rewards	primarily	by	transaction	fees.	Nodes	will	maximize	that	reward	by	changing	their	behavior:	instead	of	constantly	working	to	win	the	next	block	reward,	they	may	wait	until	a	sufficient	number	of	pending	transactions	(with	sufficient	associated	fees)	has	accumulated.	Even	though	the	potentially-interested	community	is	thick,	the	active	community	at	a	particular	point	in	time	may	be	very	thin	because	everyone	is	waiting	for	more	pending	transactions	to	arrive.	Our	observation	is	that	these	thin-community	
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problems	(caused	in	these	cases	by	the	design	of	Bitcoin)	are	all	but	inevitable	near	the	end	of	the	working	life	of	some	blockchain	systems.			The	phenomenon	of	“altcoin	infanticide”	[BMC+15]	is	a	concrete	demonstration	of	the	hazards	of	a	thin	community.	At	the	startup	of	a	new	cryptocurrency,	participants	in	the	community	of	a	rival/competitive	cryptocurrency	may	be	motivated	to	eliminate	the	new	competitor.	They	can	potentially	do	so	by	dominating	the	still-thin	community	of	the	new	cryptocurrency	and	ensuring	that	it	fails.	This	phenomenon	also	shows	that	it	may	be	too	generous	to	think	that	a	diminishing	cryptocurrency	is	not	as	much	of	a	problem	as	non-currency	blockchain	systems.	If	coin	infanticide	is	a	problem,	then	it	seems	plausible	that	coin	geronticide	is	likewise	a	potential	problem.			Although	most	successful	attacks	on	blockchain	systems	are	actually	attacks	on	badly-constructed	exchanges	or	buggy	smart	contracts,	there	is	at	least	one	case	where	a	“real”	blockchain	(Ethereum	Classic,	EC)	appears	to	have	suffered	a	51%	attack.	[B19]	Part	of	the	problem	there	was	that	EC	had	forked	from	Ethereum	and	had	substantially	fewer	miners	–	in	our	terminology,	the	EC	community	became	thinner.		
Conclusion		The	difficulty	of	solving	the	shutdown	problem	suggests	that	blockchains	are	not	a	good	match	for	storing	data	of	long-term	significance.	In	particular,	storing	such	data	on	a	blockchain	that	uses	unstable	consensus	–	like	Bitcoin	–	is	unwise.			New	systems	using	a	blockchain	to	store	data	of	long-term	significance	need	to	be	designed	with	attention	to	solving	the	shutdown	problem.	Existing	systems	may	well	need	examination	to	understand	their	risks,	possibly	followed	by	hard-fork	upgrades	to	use	more	stable	consensus.			
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